This thesis is based on four semi-structured interviews with four different Distribution grid operators (DSOs) and an economic analysis of three cases with different financing models for new connections to the grid. The results show that the interviewed DSOs use similar models, where the connecting customer covers the direct cost, including cables, capacity, and work. Some differences are observed, which can be explained by the size of the company and its specific grid structure. DSOs that have radial grids tend to charge the connecting customer closer to the actual cost, while those with a meshed grid charge for distance and a reduced capacity fee. From the economic analysis it is given that the different financing models differ a lot, whereas the one which is equally financed between the DSO and the connecting customer shows to be the best solution. This model gives the company incentives while it also strengthens customer protection from increased tariffs. The conclusion from the economic analysis together with the proposed regulation for RP5 and the result from the interviews is that the regulation should be revised. One suggestion is to reduce the depreciation from the revenue framework while the return on investment is kept.